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Abstract—Face recognition has been the focus of attention
for the past couple of decades and, as a result, a significant
progress has been made in this area. However, the problem of
spoofing attacks can challenge face biometric systems in practical
applications. In this work, an effective countermeasure against
face spoofing attacks based on a kernel discriminant analysis
approach is presented. Its success derives from three innovations.
First it is shown that the recently proposed multiscale dynamic
texture descriptor based on binarized statistical image features
on three orthogonal planes (MBSIF-TOP) is effective in detecting
spoofing attacks, showing promising performance compared to
existing alternatives.
Next, by combining MBSIF-TOP with a blur-tolerant descrip-
tor, namely the dynamic multiscale local phase quantization
representation (MLPQ-TOP), the robustness of the spoofing
attack detector can be further improved. The fusion of the
information provided by MSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP is re-
alized via a kernel fusion approach based on a fast kernel
discriminant analysis (KDA) technique. It avoids the costly eigen-
analysis computations by solving the KDA problem via spectral
regression. The experimental evaluation of the proposed system
on different databases demonstrates its advantages in detecting
spoofing attacks in various imaging conditions, compared to
existing methods.
Index Terms—Face Spoofing, Multiscale Binarized Statistical
Image Features on Three Orthogonal Planes (MBSIF-TOP), Mul-
tiscale Local Phase Quantization on Three Orthogonal Planes,
Kernel Discriminant Analysis, Kernel Fusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH face recognition technology has witnessedsignificant progress, in the past couple of decades, from
systems operating in well-controlled laboratory settings to
real-world solutions for unconstrained scenarios, the opera-
tional utility of these systems can be challenged by artificial
biometric traits, i.e. spoofing attacks. In a spoofing attack, an
imposter tries to gain illegitimate access to some service by
presenting artificial biometric data of another subject to the au-
thentication system. In a recent study, it has been observed that
face recognition systems are quite vulnerable to such attacks,
as nearly 80% of the spoofing attempts successfully passed
the authentication stage [1]. This vulnarability emphasizes the
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need for checking the authenticity of the biometric data before
proceeding to verification or recognition.
Spoofing is not specific to face recognition systems. Other
biometrics modalities suffer from similar drawbacks [2], [3],
[4], [5]. However, the abundance of still face images or video
sequences on the internet has made it particularly easy to
access a person’s facial data compared to other modalities.
Moreover, the relatively low cost of launching a face spoof
attack has made the face spoofing problem even more com-
mon. The media used for spoofing a face recognition system
vary from low quality paper prints to high quality photographs,
as well as video streams played in front of the biometric
authentication system sensor. Other media such as 3D masks
are less common [6].
Our focus in this paper is on attacks performed using a
printed photograph or a replayed video in front of the system
sensor. As spoofing attacks are realized using a variety of dif-
ferent media in a wide range of different imaging conditions,
the problem poses serious challenges in practical applications.
The research into face spoofing has become popular in the
past few years, partly motivated by the recently organized
competitions on countermeasures to 2D facial spoofing attacks
[7], [8].
In the spectrum of spoofing countermeasure approaches
in the literature, an important group of methods focuses on
modeling the dynamic textural content of image sequences
using spatio-temporal descriptors. An example of such meth-
ods is the work in [9] which employs local binary pattern
histograms on three orthogonal planes (LBP-TOP) to detect
spoofing attacks. The current work follows the same avenue
and presents an effective method for the detection of spoofing
attacks using a dynamic texture descriptor that is novel to
this application domain. More specifically, motivated by the
success of the BSIF descriptor [10] and its multiscale and
dynamic extensions in a variety of static and dynamic texture
representation and recognition problems such as face image
modeling and recognition [11], dynamic texture recognition
[12], finger print spoofing detection [13], etc., the current work
employs the dynamic multiscale BSIF descriptor [12] for face
spoofing detection.
The BSIF descriptor operates in a similar fashion to the well
known local binary pattern (LBP) operator in that it produces a
binary coded image. However, as the BSIF descriptor employs
filters based on statistical learning, it provides a better repre-
sentation of image/image-sequence content. Most importantly,
BSIF filters are designed to promote statistical independence
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of their outputs. This enhances their representational capacity,
in comparison with operators producing dependent outputs.
Arguably this also improves their sensitivity to differences in
the visual content of genuine and spoofing access attacks. A
contribution of the current work is to employ the dynamic
multiscale BSIF descriptor (MBSIF-TOP) [12] in conjunction
with kernel discriminant analysis (KDA) for face aliveness
assurance. The specific KDA method employed (SR-KDA)
avoids costly eigen-analysis computations via spectral regres-
sion. It has been found to be orders of magnitude faster than
the ordinary KDA [14].
A different but closely related dynamic texture descriptor
is the local phase quantization (LPQ) representation [15]. The
local phase quantization and its extension to time-varying tex-
tures (LPQ-TOP) [16], [17], which exploit the blur-insensitive
property of the Fourier phase spectrum, have shown promise
in texture/dynamic-texture modeling, especially when the ac-
quired images suffer from blurring effects. In our study we
include the LPQ descriptor because of its invariance to blur
that may be particularly relevant to spoofing attack detection.
We show that the LPQ-TOP representation is very effective
in discriminating real-access attempts from a certain type of
spoofing attack in a subspace determined using the SR-KDA
method.
In order to benefit from the complementary properties of
both, MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP, we combine these two
descriptors using the SR-KDA approach. The kernel fusion
is found to enhance the system performance as measured on
the CASIA face anti-spoofing database [18], as well as the
Replay-Attack [1] and NUAA databases [19].
The main contributions of the current work can be sum-
marised as follows:
• We propose the use of a discriminative representation
based on the dynamic multiscale binarized statistical im-
age features [12] and kernel discriminant analysis for face
anti-spoofing. The representation is shown to perform bet-
ter than similar dynamic texture descriptors such as LBP-
TOP [20] and LPQ-TOP [16], [17]. An in-depth analysis
of the properties of the BSIF descriptor that render it well-
suited for spoofing attack detection is beyond the scope of
this paper. The key practical motivation is the promising
performance that BSIF descriptors are shown to deliver
in the context of the spoofing detection application.
• We advocate the spectral regression kernel discriminant
analysis (SR-KDA) as a computationally efficient ap-
proach to implementing KDA.
• We demonstrate the beneficial impact of combining the
novel descriptor (MSIF-TOP) with MLPQ-TOP on the
robustness of the spoofing detection system. The ker-
nel fusion is also accomplished by SR-KDA. On the
CASIA dataset, the fusion strategy adopted is shown to
be particularly effective in real-world scenarios such as
low-resolution biometric data or short image sequences.
On the Replay-Attack and NUAA databases, the fusion
consistently improves the performance.
• The proposed system has been evaluated in challenging
conditions using standard benchmarking datasets and
associated protocols. In addition, the dependence of its
performance on data quality, on the type of spoofing
media, and the number of video frames has been inves-
tigated. We also report the results of its comparison to
similar dynamic texture descriptors and other face anti-
spoofing approaches.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the recent advances in face spoofing detection.
Section III presents the proposed countermeasure along with
details of the dynamic texture descriptors employed. The
kernel discriminant analysis technique based on spectral re-
gression and the kernel fusion method are also described. An
experimental evaluation of the proposed method on different
databases along with its comparison to other approaches is
presented in Section IV. We draw conclusions from the paper
in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A variety of different methods have been proposed for
discriminating a real access from a fake one in a face authen-
tication system. The research in this field has been reviewed
in a recent study [9] where the various approaches to face
liveness detection have been categorized according to the cues
employed. These categories include methods detecting signs
of vitality (liveness), methods gauging differences in motion
patterns and those based on differences in image quality.
Examples of methods of the first category invariably use
characteristics which are exhibited only by live faces. For
example, the method presented in [21] uses eye-blink as a
countermeasure to spoofing, formulated as inference in an
undirected conditional graphical framework. The method has
been evaluated on a publicly available blinking video database
[22]. However, eye-blink may not be considered as a reliable
countermeasure since spoofing attacks using printed masks
with the eye positions cut out can potentially pass such tests.
Eye-blink in conjunction with other cues are employed in other
works. For instance, in [23], a hybrid face liveness detection
system against spoofing with photographs, videos, and 3D
models is proposed. In this method, both eye-blink and scene
context clues are used. Eye-blink detection is formulated as in
[21], while the scene context clue is extracted by comparing
the differences of regions of interest between the reference
scene image and the input.
More recently, the authors in [24] proposed the use of the
dynamic mode decomposition (DMD) method for modeling
dynamic information of the video content, such as blinking
eyes, moving lips, and facial dynamics. The authors propose a
classification pipeline consisting of DMD, local binary patterns
and SVMs. The DMD approach is used to represent the
temporal information of an image sequence as a single image.
LBP operators are then applied on a single dynamic mode
followed by an SVM for final decision making. As the method
uses motion cues, it can also be considered as belonging to the
second class in our categorization of anti-spoofing methods,
discussed next.
The second group consists of the methods which assume
that motion patterns between different components of a real
face differ from those of a fake face. This assumption is based
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on the fact that the spoofing media are usually flat 2D planes
compared to the 3D structure of a real face. Moreover, motions
in spoofing attacks are rigid whereas a combination of both
rigid and non-rigid motions exists in real-access attempts; this
may serve as a complementary cue for spoofing detection. As
an example of the methods in this group, one may consider the
work in [25] which presents a spoofing detection method for
video sequences using motion magnification. For this purpose,
Eulerian motion magnification is used to enhance the facial
expressions. Two kinds of features are deployed: the first one
is based on a configuration of LBP and the second is built upon
the motion estimation approach using the HOOF descriptor.
The method has been reported to achieve good performance
on the Print Attack and Replay Attack data sets. Other work in
[26] presented a method for evaluating liveness in face image
sequences using a set of automatically located facial points.
Geometric invariants are then used for detecting replay attacks.
The proposed system was evaluated on two publicly available
databases of NUAA [19] and HONDA [27].
In [28], based on the differences in optical flow fields
generated by the movements of 2D planes and 3D objects,
a new liveness detection method for face spoofing detection
is proposed. Using the assumption that the test region is
a 2D plane, a reference field from the actual optical flow
field data is obtained. Next, a measure of difference between
the two fields is used to distinguish a 3D face from a 2D
photograph. Good performance has been obtained on a local
data set. Other work in [29] proposed a countermeasure based
on foreground/background motion correlation using optical
flow. The method was shown to exhibit promising results on
the publicly available Photo-Attack database.
The last category of face liveness detection methods relies
on image quality measures to discriminate a live face from
a fake one. These methods mainly rely on the reflectance
properties of attack media which differ from those of a real
face. As an example, the method in [30] proposes a multi-
spectral face liveness detection method adaptive to various
user-system distances. Using the Lambertian model, the multi-
spectral properties of human skin versus non-skin are analyzed
and the discriminative wavelengths are then chosen. An SVM
classifier is then trained to learn the multi-spectral distribution
for a final genuine/fake decision. Good performance has been
reported on a private data set.
The work in [31] detects print-attacks by exploiting differ-
ences in the 2D Fourier spectra between spoofing attempts
based on hard-copies of faces and and those based on real-
access attempts. The method is reported to work well for
down-sampled photo attacks; however it would probably fail
for higher-quality data. Based on the assumption that most
of the information content of real images is concentrated
in specific frequency bands, the work in [18] used a set of
difference-of-Gaussian filters to choose a specific frequency
band, to be used as the features for discriminating real accesses
from spoofing attempts. The method has been evaluated on the
CASIA face anti-spoofing data set. Other work in [19] used
the Lambertian model and proposed two methods to extract
the essential information of different surface properties of a
live human face or a photograph. The first one is a variational
Retinex-based method while the second uses differences of
Gaussian filters. Based on these, two extensions to the sparse
logistic regression model were developed and evaluated on the
NUAA data set.
Inspired by image quality assessment, the properties of
printing artifacts and differences in light reflection that can
be detected using texture features, in [32], it is proposed to
detect spoofing from the point of view of texture analysis. The
approach analyses the texture of facial images using multiscale
local binary patterns operators and is evaluated on the NUAA
publicly available data set. The work in [33] proposes a single
image-based face liveness detection method for discriminating
2D paper masks from the live faces. The method exploits
frequency and texture information using power spectrum and
LBPs. Three liveness detectors utilizing LBP, power spectrum
and the fusion of the two were tested on two databases. In [34],
an anti-spoofing method based on a set of low-level feature
descriptors is proposed. The approach exploits both spatial
and temporal information to learn distinctive characteristics
of the classes of real and spoof access attempts respectively.
The resulting descriptors encode information about shape,
color and texture. The work in [35] studies the problem of
fusion of motion- and texture-based methods, and proposes a
score level fusion to combine different visual cues to improve
performance. The method has achieved good performance on
the Replay-Attack database.
The authors of [36] propose to illuminate the face during
image capture. The reflected color from the face served as
a means to watermark the image. The method is based on
the assumption that a pre-recorded video is highly unlikely to
contain the correctly reflected color sequence. In [37], a face
spoof detection algorithm based on image distortion analysis
is proposed. Four different features of specular reflection,
blurriness, chromatic moment, and color diversity are used
to form an image distortion feature vector. An ensemble
classifier, consisting of multiple SVMs trained for different
face spoof attacks, is then employed to discriminate between
genuine faces and spoofing attacks. Motivated by the success
of deep networks, the work in [38] considers two approaches
for face spoofing detection. The first approach investigates
suitable convolutional network architectures while the second
tries to learn the weights of the network via back-propagation.
The method then combines and contrasts the two different
approaches.
While most of the existing approaches are subject-
independent, recently there have been some attempts to deploy
subject-specific information in a face anti-spoofing system.
For instance, the work in [39] proposes a subject-specific
face anti-spoofing approach which tries to dismiss the interfer-
ence among subjects using a classifier specifically trained for
each subject. The work presents a subject domain adaptation
method to handle the lack of fake samples during training,
and synthesizes virtual features to train individual face anti-
spoofing classifiers. The idea is validated on the CASIA FASD
and Replay-Attack data sets using MsLBP and HOG features.
Other work in [40] studied the client-specific information
embedded within the features used and analyzed how it affects
the performance of a face anti-spoofing system. The authors
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built two anti-spoofing solutions, one relying on a generative
and another one on a discriminative paradigm. Using both
texture and motion cues, the proposed approach has been
reported to be superior to the client-independent methods when
tested on the Replay-Attack data set.
III. METHODOLOGY
The proposed approach for face liveness detection uses
histograms of dynamic texture descriptors on three orthog-
onal planes to encode texture micro-structure of an image
sequence. For this purpose, the use of two effective spatio-
temporal texture descriptors, namely histograms of multiscale
dynamic binarized statistical image features (MBSIF-TOP)
[12] and multiscale dynamic local phase quantization (MLPQ-
TOP) [17], [16], [15] is advocated. Once the histograms
of dynamic textures are obtained, they are projected onto a
discriminative subspace constructed by KDA to separate real
faces from spoofing attempts. The discriminative subspace for
face liveness detection is constructed using an efficient kernel
discriminant analysis approach based on spectral regression
(SR-KDA) which has been found to be faster than the ordinary
KDA by avoiding costly eigen-analysis computations [14].
The two representations are then combined to further enhance
system performance. Their fusion is again accomplished using
the SR-KDA method. The multiple kernels corresponding to
different representations are combined via a sum rule over the
kernel matrices.
The proposed kernel fusion technique for face spoofing
detection improves the performance, compared to either one
of the descriptors used individually, in most cases. It is
computationally more efficient compared to conventional KDA
methods. This makes the proposal a viable solution as a
preliminary step in checking the authenticity of the biometric
data captured by a face biometric system. A description of the
two descriptors followed by an outline of the SRKDA method
is provided next.
A. Descriptors
1) Binarized Statistical Image Features(BSIF): Binarized
statistical image features are the key constituent of a generative
texture descriptor based on independent component analysis
[10]. The BISF descriptor uses pre-learned filters to extract
features from local image patches. Considering an image patch
X of size l× l pixels and a linear filter Wi of a corresponding
size, the filter response si is obtained by
si =
∑
y
Wi(y)X(y) = w
>
i x (1)
where vectors x and wi contain the pixels of X and elements
of Wi, respectively while .> denotes transpose. The binarized
feature bi is then obtained by thresholding the filter response
si at zero, i.e.
bi =
{
1 si > 0,
0 otherwise.
(2)
In summary, given an image patch X of size l × l pixels,
one applies N filters to X using the filter matrix WN×l
2
and
Fig. 1. Construction of a histogram on three orthogonal planes in the MBSIF-
TOP, MLPQ-TOP and MLBP-TOP representations.
obtains N responses which are stacked into vector s. Next the
filter responses are independently binarized to form an N-bit
binary codeword for each pixel which is then converted into
an integer number.
Learning BSIF Filters:
In order to obtain a useful set of filters, the statistical
independence of the si terms is maximized using independent
component analysis (ICA). For this purpose, the filter matrix
W is decomposed into two parts as
s = Wx = UV x = Uz (3)
where z = V x, and U is an N×N square matrix estimated via
ICA. Matrix V performs simultaneous whitening and dimen-
sionality reduction using principal component analysis. Given
whitened data samples z, the independent component analysis
is then used to estimate an orthogonal matrix U . Finally, given
U and V , one obtains the filter matrix W = UV . In this
work, 8 filters are used (N = 8). Once the 8 filter responses
are obtained at all pixel locations and the corresponding 8-bit
codewords are generated and converted to integer numbers, a
histogram is used to summarize the filter outputs.
In [12], the BSIF approach is extended to the spatio-
temporal domain by considering an image sequence on three
orthogonal planes, similar in spirit to the LBP-TOP approach
[20]. In the LBP-TOP approach [20], an image sequence is
considered as a stack of XT planes in axis Y, YT planes
in axis X and XY planes in axis T, where the YT and XT
planes convey information about the space-time transitions
of a video sequence while the XY plane represents spatial
information. In order to extend the BSIF descriptor to the
spatio-temporal domain, the same procedure as in the static
case is followed to learn three different sets of BSIF filters on
the three different planes. Once the filters are applied to each
individual plane, the filter responses are summarized using
histograms. Finally, these three histograms are normalized to
yield a probability distribution and concatenated to form the
final BSIF-TOP descriptor, Fig. 1. In [12], the BSIF-TOP
approach is also extended to a multiscale framework to capture
dynamic content at multiple resolutions. The extension of the
BSIF-TOP to a multiscale framework entails applying filters of
various sizes to an image. In this work, the filters are learned in
six scales using an external set of image sequences of random
scenes using the fast ICA package [41].
2) Local Phase Quantization(LPQ): Local phase quantiza-
tion (LPQ) is a texture representation approach based on the
blur invariance property of the Fourier phase spectrum [15].
The LPQ descriptor uses local phase information extracted
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using a short-term Fourier transform computed over a rectan-
gular region. The short-term Fourier transform over a region
of size l × l centered at pixel position m of the image X(y)
is defined as
F (f,m) =
∑
y
X(m− y)e−2pif>y = w>f x (4)
where wf denotes the basis vector of the 2D discrete Fourier
transform at frequency f while x stands for the vector contain-
ing all l2 pixels. In the LPQ representation, the local Fourier
coefficients are computed at four frequencies f1 = [a, 0]>,
f2 = [0, a]
>, f3 = [a, a]> and f4 = [a,−a]>, where a is
a sufficiently small scalar. The result for each pixel location
is a vector FCm = [F (f1,m), F (f2,m), F (f3,m), F (f4,m)].
Assume
Fm = [Re{FCm}, Im{FCm}] (5)
where Re{.} and Im{.} return the real and imaginary parts
of a complex number, respectively. The corresponding 8× l2
transformation matrix which would produce Fm as Fm = Tx
would then be
T = [Re{wf1 , wf2 , wf3 , wf4}, Im{wf1 , wf2 , wf3 , wf4}]> (6)
Let the covariance matrix of the transform coefficient vector
Fm be D. A singular value decomposition of matrix D is
obtained as
D = AΣB> (7)
The matrix B is then used to perform a whitening transform
on Fm as
Gm = B
>Fm (8)
Once Gm is computed for all pixel positions, the informa-
tion in the Fourier coefficients is recorded by binarizing the
elements of Gm as
qj =
{
1 if gj ≥ 0,
0 otherwise. (9)
where gj is the jth component of the vector Gm. The resultant
8-bit binary coefficients qj are then represented as integers.
Once the binary codes are obtained, a histogram of the
obtained values from all positions is constructed.
The same approach as in the BSIF-TOP [12] and LBP-TOP
[20] methods is employed to extend the LPQ descriptor to
the temporal domain [16], [17], i.e. the basic LPQ features
are extracted independently from the sets of three orthogonal
planes: XY, XT and YT, considering only the co-occurrence
statistics in these three directions, and stacking them into a
single histogram. In order to capture texture details at different
scales, the window sizes are varied: in total six different
window sizes of {3× 3, 5× 5, . . . , 13× 13} are employed in
this work to obtain a multiscale representation of the dynamic
textural content of an image sequence. The histograms of each
plane are normalized independently so that each sums to 1 to
yield a coherent representation. They are then concatenated to
form the final MLPQ-TOP descriptor.
In the current work, all the frames of a given video sequence
are used for feature extraction from the XY, XT and YT planes.
The discrepancies between different video sequences in terms
of the number of frames are compensated for by normalizing
the histograms obtained in the previous step. The effect of
using video of different lengths on system performance is
investigated in Section IV.
3) Motivation for the advocated descriptors: Most impor-
tantly, the list of motivations in support of the proposed
descriptors for the design of a face biometric spoofing de-
tector includes the desirable properties of BSIFs which are
inherited from the BSIF filters being designed so as to promote
statistical independence of their outputs. This enhances their
representational capacity, as compared with operators pro-
ducing dependent outputs. Arguably this also improves their
sensitivity to subtle differences in the visual content of genuine
and spoofing access attacks. Moreover, as BSIF filters can be
learned using an independent set of random image sequences
distinct from the databases used for evaluation, the BSIF rep-
resentation circumvents the need for application specific filter
design and parameter tuning. As such, the BSIF representation
may act as a generic descriptor to handle different kinds of
face artifacts in real-life situations. On the other hand, the
LPQ descriptor is known to possess invariance to blurring
effects which may be relevant to spoofing attack detection.
In addition, employing the aforementioned descriptors in a
multiscale framework helps to capture highly varying face
information more effectively, and this appears to enhance
robustness of the system.
B. Kernel Discriminant Analysis Using Spectral Regression
Assume that there exist m samples x1, x2, . . . xm ∈ Rn,
which belong to C classes and F is a feature space induced
by a non-linear mapping φ : Rn → F . For a suitably chosen
mapping, an inner product 〈., .〉 on F may be represented as
〈φ(xi), φ(xj)〉 = κ(xi, xj), where κ(., .) is a positive semi-
definite kernel function. Let Sφb and S
φ
t denote respectively the
between-class and total scatter matrices in the feature space F .
KDA seeks to find an optimal projection function Vopt in the
feature space by solving the following optimization problem
Vopt = arg max
V
V >Sφb V
V >Sφt V
(10)
The columns ν of Vopt are the generalized eigenvectors
satisfying
Sφb ν = λS
φ
t ν (11)
It is known that the eigenvectors satisfying the preceding
problem can be expressed as linear combinations of all of the
samples [42], [43]. Thus, there exists coefficients αi such that
each eigenvector ν can be represented as ν =
∑m
i=1 αiφ(xi).
In [42], it is shown that Eq. 10 is equivalent to
Uopt = arg max
U
U>KWKU
U>KKU
(12)
where K is the kernel matrix (Kij = κ(xi, xj)) and W is a
matrix reflecting the number of samples in each class, defined
as
Wij =
{
1/mk if xk, xj ∈ kth class;
0 otherwise. (13)
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In this case, the columns of Uopt (α’s) are given by the eigen-
vectors corresponding to the non-zero eigenvalues satisfying
KWKα = λKKα (14)
The number of eigenvectors α satisfying Eq. 14 is bounded by
C−1 as the rank of Sφb is at most C−1. Once the eigenvectors
are found, the projection of a new sample (x) onto the feature
space using each eigenvector ν is then given by
〈ν, φ(x)〉 =
m∑
i=1
αi〈φ(xi), φ(x)〉 =
m∑
i=1
αiκ(xi, x)
= α>K(:, x) (15)
where K(:, x) = [κ(x1, x), . . . , κ(xm, x)]>.
It is shown in [14] that instead of solving Eq. 12 via the
usual eigen-analysis computations, the KDA projections can
be obtained using spectral regression by solving the following
two linear equations:
1) Solve Wy = λy for y;
2) Find α satisfying Kα = y
The Cholesky decomposition is used to solve the linear
equation Kα = y. If K is positive-definite, then there
exists a unique solution for α. If K is singular, it may be
approximated by the positive definite matrix K + δI where I
is the identity matrix and δ > 0 is a regularization parameter.
In this paper, a Gaussian RBF is used for the kernel function,
i.e. Kij = κ(xi, xj) = exp(−‖xi − xj‖2/M), resulting in
a positive definite kernel matrix [14], [43]. Following [44],
[45], M is set to the average squared Euclidean distance
between all training samples. Solving for α may then be
performed using the Cholesky factorization and forward-back
substitution. Finding vector y is trivial and can be performed
directly without eigen-analysis [14]. As a result, one only
needs to solve a set of regularized regression problems, and
there is no eigenvector computation involved; this allows
handling large kernel matrices and results in a considerable
reduction of computational cost [14].
1) Kernel Fusion: In our multiple-descriptor-based ap-
proach, there are two sources of information, each provided
by a different descriptor, which can be combined to enhance
system performance. Although other alternatives exist [46],
linear kernel combinations [47] are amongst the most widely
employed kernel fusion techniques. In this work, we have
opted for a linear combination approach with a uniform
weighting assigned to the kernels associated with different
representations. This choice is driven by the simplicity of the
approach as well as the proved efficacy in other classifica-
tion problems [11]. The motivation for fusion could be not
only performance, but also robustness, i.e. even if in certain
scenarios BSIF and LPQ can deliver excellent performance
on their own, they are not the individually best descriptors in
all scenarios. Fusion provides much more robust performance
overall.
Once the kernels are combined, an optimal solution is found
in the implicit feature space which merges the representations.
This is accomplished by solving the problem in Eq. 12 with
the kernel matrix replaced by Kc given as
Kc = KB +KL (16)
where KB and KL correspond to the kernel matrices con-
structed using the MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP descriptors,
respectively.
C. Testing A New Face
During testing, the combined kernel vector kc is formed by
kc = kB + kL (17)
where the elements of the vectors kB and kL are the respective
similarities (measured using the employed Gaussian RBF
κ(., .)) of a query face sequence and training samples using
the MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP representations. In this
work, spoofing detection is posed as a two-class classification
problem. As a result, only a single transformation vector for
the KDA projection would be obtained, i.e. only a single
vector α will satisfy Eq. 14. In this case, after computing the
inner product of the test vector and the unique α satisfying
Eq. 14, the projection is compared against the projection of
the mean of the positive training samples in the induced
feature space (ω), and the distance thus obtained is used as a
dissimilarity criterion. In this work, we have chosen the mean
of the positive class (real accesses) as the reference point to
measure the distance of a query pattern, since the mean of the
imposter set (spoofing attacks) may not serve as a stable and
suitable reference due to the diversity of the attack media. The
architecture of the proposed system for face spoofing detection
is given in Fig. 2.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, an experimental evaluation of the proposed
method on the CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database [18], the
Replay-Attack database [1] and the NUAA database [19] is
provided.
A. The CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Database (CASIA FASD)
The performance of an algorithm may vary depending on
the imaging quality. In this respect, one of the appealing
properties of the CASIA FASD [18] is the inclusion of various
imaging qualities. Three different cameras are used in this
database to collect the data. The data set consists of video
sequences of both real and fake access attempts. During
recording, subjects were asked to blink and not to keep still.
Three kinds of fake face attacks designed in this database are
as follows.
Warped photo attack: A Sony NEX-5 camera was used to
record a 1920 × 1080 image for every subject. This high
resolution image was then used to print a photo on copper
paper, having a higher quality than normal A4 printing paper.
In a warped photo attack, the attacker warps the photo, trying
to simulate facial motion.
Cut photo attack: The photos mentioned above are then used
for the cut photo attacks. In this scenario, the eye regions are
cut off. An attacker then hides behinds the photo and blinks
through the holes of the eye region. Another possibility is to
place an intact photo tightly behind the cut photo, and simulate
blinking by moving the photo behind. In this database, both
implementations exist.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the proposed system.(α,ω, kB and kL are explained within the text.)
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Fig. 3. Effectiveness of Different Planes of the employed dynamic represen-
tations on the CASIA FASD.
Video attack: In this setting, the high resolution videos are
displayed using an iPad in front of the camera.
For CASIA FASD a test protocol is designed which consists
of seven scenarios, including the above warped photo test, cut
photo test and video test, and also the quality and overall tests
described next.
Quality Test: In this case, the three imaging qualities are
considered separately. In particular, the samples used for
training and test are both from low quality, normal quality
and high quality video streams.
The Overall Test: In this scenario, all the data are combined
together to be used for a general and overall evaluation.
The CASIA FASD is split into the training set comprised
of 20 subjects and the test set containing 30 individuals.
For each of the above seven test scenarios, the data should
then be selected from the corresponding training and test
sets for model training and performance reporting. Detection-
Error Trade-off (DET) curves [48] are used to evaluate the
system accuracy. From DET curves, the point where the False
Acceptance Rate (FAR) equals the False Rejection Rate (FRR)
is located, and the corresponding value, i.e. the Equal Error
Rate (EER) is reported.
In the following, we investigate the merits of the proposed
approach in various conditions. In particular, the effectiveness
of each of the three different planes in the the spatio-temporal
multiscale representations, the effect of using a multiscale dy-
namic representation, the effect of quality and spoofing media
and the effect of video sequence length on performance are
investigated. Finally, a comparison to other existing methods
is performed.
1) Effectiveness of Different Planes: First, the usefulness
of spatial and temporal information is investigated. For this
purpose, the MBSIF/MLPQ histograms on each of the three
XY, XT and YT planes are extracted and used individually
and also in combination for spoofing detection. The spectral
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Fig. 4. Effect of Number of Scales Used in the Dynamic Descriptors on the
CASIA FASD.
regression kernel discriminant analysis (SRKDA) approach
[14] is used to construct a discriminative representation for
each of the four scenarios. The SRKDA approach is trained
using all the real-access image sequences and the videos of
spoofing attacks of the training subset of the CASIA data set.
For each video stream, the face is located using the Viola-
Jones face detector. For this purpose, the detector is run on
the first frame of each video sequence and the face location
obtained is then generalized to all frames. In cases where the
face detector fails to find a face in the first frame, one or more
subsequent frames are employed until a face is detected.
After resizing the detected face to 120 × 100 pixels, the
multiscale BSIF and LPQ histograms are extracted on the XY,
XT and YT planes. For performance evaluation, as indicated
in the CASIA FASD protocol, the equal error rate (EER) on
the test set is used. The results obtained are given in Fig. 3.
As can be seen from the figure, the XT and YT planes indeed
provide quite useful discriminative information. Interestingly,
the spatio-temporal information on these planes proves to
be as good or even better for classification than the spatial
information alone. This can be observed for example by the
lower EER obtained using the MBSIF-TOP representations
on the YT plane compared to the XY plane. It can also be
observed that if a histogram concatenation for fusing spatial
and temporal information is used, the performance is improved
for all three systems (BSIF, LPQ, and the fusion of the two
descriptors). It can be concluded that the inclusion of dynamic
information results in improved performance for face liveness
detection.
2) Effect of a Multiscale Representation: Next, we inves-
tigate the merits of a multiscale dynamic representation for
face spoofing detection. The effect of using a larger number
of scales is investigated by gradually increasing the number
of scales used. In this experiment, the [x−y] notation denotes
that all the scales between the x and y inclusive are combined
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Fig. 5. Effect of Quality on the Performance on the CASIA FASD.
to form a multi-resolution representation. All the positive and
negative samples in the CASIA FASD are used to train the
classifier and the performance is recorded as the EER on
the test set. The results obtained on the CASIA FASD are
illustrated in Fig. 4. As can be observed from the figure,
apart from some fluctuations in EERs (especially for the LPQ
representation), a multiscale representation generally performs
better than a single scale approach. In the experiments to
follow, the number of scales is fixed to six, as using six scales
has been found almost to saturate the performance.
3) Effect of Quality and Spoofing Media: As noted earlier,
in the CASIA FASD data, images corresponding to different
qualities exist. These are low quality, normal quality and high
quality image sequences. In addition, different media are used
for spoofing attacks. The media used for spoofing attacks
are warped paper, cut paper and videos played on an iPad.
In this section, we analyse the effects of quality of image
sequences and spoofing media on the system performance. In
this experiment, the training and test data are selected from the
relevant data in the training and the test subsets. Three different
qualities (low, normal and high) and three different media
(warped photo, cut photo and video attacked) are examined
separately.
The results of the analysis for the MBSIF-TOP, MLPQ-
TOP and the kernel fusion methods are given in Fig. 5. In this
experiment, six scales and a combination of three planes are
used. As can be seen from the figure, with low quality image
sequences, the proposed systems achieve relatively low equal
error rates. With increasing image quality, the performance
of all three systems degrades. The hypothesis is that one
of the discriminating factors between the spoofing attacks
and real accesses is the high frequency content of image
sequences which are likely to be attenuated in spoofing attacks.
However, as the high frequency content of spoofing attacks
is strengthened by increasing the device quality, the ability
to distinguish them from genuine accesses is diminished.
Further investigation is needed to fully characterize the effect
of quality on performance. It is pertinent also to examine the
possibility of degrading the quality artificially, or deliberately
using a poor quality device, to achieve better detection perfor-
mance.
Regarding the effect of spoofing media, examination of
Fig. 6 reveals that all three systems perform well for the
warped attacks. However, as expected, the error rates increase
when the spoofing media are face prints, in which eyes
positions are cut out and blinking is performed. Fig. 7 depicts
typical MBSIF-TOP histograms corresponding to cut-photo
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Fig. 6. Effect of Spoofing Media on the performance on the CASIA FASD.
Fig. 7. MBSIF-TOP histograms corresponding to the cut-photo and warped-
photo attack scenarios of a subject from the CASIA FASD.
and warped-photo attacks for a subject from the CASIA FASD.
Comparison of the two histograms reveals that the histogram
corresponding to cut-photo attack has more dynamic content,
partly caused by blinking. This is especially observable in the
XT and YT components of the histograms, located on the
right of the histograms, which makes the features appear more
similar to the features corresponding to real-access attempts.
It can be concluded that blinking plays an important role for
discriminating the spoofing attacks from real accesses. In the
video attack scenario, the performance of the three systems
based on BSIF, LPQ, and fusion deteriorates compared to the
warped paper attack scenario. However, the error rates for the
video attacks are better than those for the cut paper scenario,
which can be explained by the limited quality of the video
displays and reflections from an iPad screen, both of which
make it easier to discriminate an attack from a real-access
request.
4) Effect of Time Window Length: In the previous ex-
periments, all the frames of a relevant video sequence in
the CASIA FASD [18] were used to construct the spatio-
temporal representations. The video sequences in the CASIA
FASD may be as long as 10 seconds. However, in practical
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Fig. 8. Effect of Time Window Length on the performance on the CASIA
FASD.
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Fig. 9. DET curves of different dynamic representations in spoofing detection
on the CASIA FASD.
applications such a long capture time should preferably be
avoided to reduce the computational cost and speed up the
whole process in the operation phase. In addition, long video
sequences may not be available during training. In this section,
the effects of video length (in terms of number of frames) on
the performance is analyzed. For this purpose, the equal error
rates corresponding to different video lengths are recorded.
The results on the CASIA FASD are given in Fig. 8. From
the figure, it can be observed that by increasing the number
of frames, which results in a more stable representation, the
error rates tend to decrease. However, the proposed systems’
performance deteriorates slowly when using fewer frames.
This is apparent from the equal error of ≈ 10% obtained using
less than two seconds of video (43 frames on average) for the
kernel fusion approach. Moreover, reducing the length of the
video sequences by half (from 170 to 85 frames on average)
results in almost no loss of performance in any of the three
systems.
5) Comparison of the MBSIF-TOP, MLPQ-TOP and
MLBP-TOP: An experiment is carried out to compare the
individual potential of MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP with that
of the baseline descriptor, namely MLBP-TOP, in detecting
spoofing attacks. The three descriptors are trained using the
training subset of the CASIA FASD and tested on the test
subset. The results are reported as detection-error-trade off
(DET) curves in Fig. 9. It can be observed from the figure
that MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP descriptors perform better
than the MLBP-TOP representation. Although MLPQ-TOP
performs only slightly better than MLBP-TOP, MBSIF-TOP
outperforms both descriptors by a larger margin. The perfor-
mance of the system based on the fusion of MBSIF-TOP and
MLPQ-TOP representations is also included for comparison.
6) Comparison of the Proposed Method to Other Ap-
proaches: Finally, we compare the three systems (MBSIF-
TOP, MLPQ-TOP and the kernel fusion approach) in the seven
scenarios of the CASIA FASD to other existing approaches
reported in the literature. The results are reported in Table
I. The following observations from the table are in order.
First of all, in most cases, the MBSIF-TOP approach performs
better than MLPQ-TOP. Most importantly, in the overall test
scenario, the EER of the MBSIF-TOP is lower than that of the
MLPQ-TOP, which demonstrates the efficacy of the MBSIF-
TOP representation for spoofing detection. Second, the kernel
fusion of the two descriptors performs better or on a par with
either one of the single descriptors in five out of seven test
scenarios. As already observed in the previous experiments,
the fusion technique is especially advantageous when dealing
with relatively short or low-resolution video sequences. Third,
the proposed approach based on a kernel fusion of MBSIF-
TOP and MLPQ-TOP descriptors compares very favorably to
the existing approaches. It can be observed that the kernel
fusion technique achieves the lowest error rate in the overall
test scenario among other competitors. In addition, in four
out of the six remaining test scenarios, the proposed fusion
approach achieves the lowest error rates.
B. The Replay-Attack database
The Replay-Attack database [1] consists of 1200 short
video recordings of both real-access and attack attempts of
50 different individuals. The data set includes 200 real-access
videos, 200 print attack videos, 400 phone attack videos,
and 400 tablet attack videos. For performance evaluation,
the data set is divided into three subsets of training (360
videos), development (360 videos), and testing (480 videos).
The training and the development subgroups contain 60 real-
access videos and 300 attack videos each, whereas the testing
subset contains 80 real-access and 400 attack videos. The
training set is used to train a classifier and the development
set is typically used to adjust classifier parameters. The test
set is intended to be used only for performance evaluation.
In the evaluation of the proposed method on this data set,
we used the training set to learn the KDA projections while
the development set is used to a set a threshold so that the
false acceptance error rate is equal to the false rejection error
rate. The threshold thus obtained is then used to classify
a test pattern. In this experiment, we have used multiscale
representations of the two descriptors on three orthogonal
planes to form the features.
The results obtained on this data set along with some other
methods are reported in Table II. A number of observations
from the table are in order. First of all, it can be observed that
the MBSIF-TOP descriptor performs better than the MLPQ-
TOP representation. Second, the proposed anti-spoofing tech-
nique based on kernel fusion is instrumental in improving
the classification accuracy. In this case, the half total error
rate obtained on the test set of the replay-attack database
using the fusion technique is 1.0% whereas the half total
error rate obtained using the MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP
representations is 1.38% and 3.75% respectively. The best
reported result among the other methods is 0.0%, obtained by
both the CASIA and LNMIIT methods[8]. However, as also
observed in [24], performance on the Replay-Attack database
without properly normalizing face images may be artificially
boosted. This is due to the fact that spoofing attacks in this
data set have larger faces compared to the faces of the valid
accesses. Moreover in the proposed method only the face
region, as detected by a generic face detection method, is used
for spoofing detection, whereas the CASIA and the LNMIIT
methods [8] either rely on the background information or use
different human body regions for classification.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF EER’S (%) OF DIFFERENT METHODS ON THE CASIA FASD.
Scenario Low Normal High Warped Cut Video Overall
MLPQ-TOP+KDA 4.3 5 21.7 2.9 11.6 5.8 13
MBSIF-TOP+KDA 3.6 8.7 13 1.4 8.7 4.3 7.5
Kernel Fusion 0.7 8.7 13 1.4 10.1 4.3 7.2
CASIA Baseline [18] 13 13 26 16 6 224 17
LBP-TOP [9] 10 12 13 6 12 10 10
IQA-based [49] 31.7 22.2 5.6 26.1 18.3 34.4 32.4
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF HALF TOTAL ERROR RATES (%) OF DIFFERENT METHODS
ON THE EVALUATION AND TEST SETS OF THE REPLAY-ATTACK DATABASE.
Method Development Set Test Set
MLPQ-TOP+KDA 5.0 3.75
MBSIF-TOP+KDA 1.67 1.38
Kernel Fusion 1.67 1.0
LBPu23×3 [1] 14.84 15.16
LBP + SVM [50] 13.9 13.87
LBP − TOP + SVM [50] 7.88 7.60
IQA-based [49] - 15.2
LLR [35] 4.57 5.11
Spoofnet [38] - 3.5
IDA [37] - 7.41
DMD+SVM [24] 8.5 7.5
DMD+LBP+SVM [24] 5.33 3.75
MsLBP [39] 0.87 1.45
HOG [39] 0.24 3.58
client-specific LBP-TOP [40] 3.71 3.95
HOOF+LDA (NN) [25] 0.0 1.25
CASIA [8] 0.0 0.0
LNMIIT [8] 0.0 0.0
C. The NUAA photograph imposter database
In the previous experiments, we have evaluated the system
performance on video sequences. However, the spoofing/real-
access data may only be available in the form of still im-
ages. In this section, an analysis is performed to investigate
the applicability of the system based on static MBSIF and
MLPQ representations combined via the fusion technique to
detect spoofing attacks. The system architecture is exactly the
same as in the previous experiments except that instead of
the dynamic MBSIF and MLPQ representations, their static
versions operating on still images are used. A characteristic of
the NUAA database [19] is that it consists of still images. The
NUAA photograph imposter data set is collected using several
generic cheap webcams [19]. The database was collected in
three different sessions, spaced at about fortnightly intervals.
The place and illumination conditions of each session were
also different.
In total, 15 subjects are included in the database. In each
session, images of both live subjects and their photographs
are captured. For each subject in each session, a series of
images (with a frame rate of 20 fps and 500 images for
each subject) are collected. During image capture time, each
subject was asked to face the webcam frontally with neutral
expression and with no apparent movements such as eye-
blink or head movement. In other words, a live human tried
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF EER’S (%) OF DIFFERENT METHODS ON THE NUAA
DATA SET.
Method EER
Gabor [32] 9.5
LPQ [32] 4.6
LBP[32] 2.9
The method of [51] 1.9
MLPQ-TOP 3.5
MBSIF-TOP 2.3
Kernel Fusion 1.8
to create a sequence of frames looking as if captured from
a photo as much as possible. A high definition photo for
each subject using a common Canon camera was captured
in a way that the face area took at least 2/3 of the whole
area of the photograph. The photos used for the attacks were
then generated in two different ways. First, a photograph was
printed on a photographic paper with the common size of
6.8cm×10.2cm (small) and 8.9cm×12.7cm (big). Next, each
photo was printed on a 70g A4 paper using a normal color
HP printer. Five categories of the photo-attacks are simulated
in front of the webcam. Six scales of BSIF and LPQ features
are used in this experiment. The performance of the proposed
approach along with some other methods is reported in Table
III. It can be seen that the kernel fusion technique compares
very favorably to the other existing methods, ranking first in
performance on this data set closely followed by the method
of [51].
D. Cross-database Evaluation
A desirable characteristic of a classification system is its
generalization capability. This aspect of the proposed method
has been investigated on the Replay-Attack data set in an intra-
database setting where the classifier was trained on a disjoint
set and the performance was gauged on separate evaluation
and test sets. The generalization ability of the system in
this case is manifested by the relatively close error rates
obtained on the evaluation and test sets (Table II). However, a
more challenging scenario may be considered, using different
databases for training and performance reporting. In order to
investigate this aspect of the system we used the training
subset of the Replay-Attack database to train the classifier.
Next, the system is evaluated on the test set of the CASIA
FASD. Given that the subjects and the imaging conditions
and devices are different between the two databases, the test
is quite challenging.
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF EER’S (%) ON THE CASIA FASD USING
CROSS-DATABASE AND ORIGINAL PROTOCOLS IN THE OVERALL
SCENARIO.
Method Original Protocol Cross-database Evaluation
MLPQ-TOP 13 33.0
MBSIF-TOP 7.5 31.9
Kernel Fusion 7.2 30.2
The result of this evaluation in the overall scenario of the
CASIA FASD is reported in Table IV. For comparison the
results obtained on the CASIA FASD following an intra-
database protocol (original protocol) are also reported. The
results demonstrate a considerable degradation in performance,
indicating some degree of over-fitting of the classifier to data.
One solution to the problem is to employ additional cues
besides dynamic texture descriptors. Moreover, as proposed
in [52] different strategies can be adopted to improve per-
formance in such cross-database evaluations using the texture
based representations. In a nearly similar cross-database set-
ting in [52] the equal error rate obtained on the CASIA FASD
was reported to be more than 60%, nearly twice the error rate
obtained using the proposed method.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper addressed the problem of face biometrics spoof-
ing detection based on dynamic texture analysis of video se-
quences captured during access time. The use of the multiscale
binarised statistical image features descriptor (MBSIF-TOP),
a novel descriptor in the context of this application, was
proposed as the representation to be adopted in a spoofing
detection system designed using the computationally efficient
spectral regression kernel discriminant analysis (SR-KDA).
The proposed method was comprehensively evaluated on
benchmarking datasets using standard protocols and shown
to be superior to similar dynamic texture analysis schemes
employing the MLBP-TOP and MLPQ-TOP descriptors. Its
superior spoofing detection performance is attributed to the
filters producing BSIF, which are designed to promote statis-
tical independence of their outputs. The benefit of statistical
independence is twofold: improved representational capacity
of the texture descriptor, and its enhanced sensitivity to minor
differences in the visual content of genuine and spoofing attack
accesses.
A further performance improvement has been achieved
by combining the MBSIF-TOP and MLPQ-TOP descriptors
using kernel fusion. The combination benefits from the blur
invariance properties of the MLPQ-TOP descriptor. The fused
system has been demonstrated to ourperform the state of the art
face spoofing detection systems in most of the benchmarking
tests adopted by the research community. In particular, on
the CASIA FASD dataset containing video sequences that are
relatively short or of low quality (a common case in practical
scenarios) the fusion consistently improved the system perfor-
mance. On the Replay-Attack and NUAA data sets, the fusion
always led to better performance.
Future work will include a further investigation into the re-
lationship between image quality and performance in spoofing
detection. It would also be interesting to investigate in depth
why MLPQ and, in particular, MBSIF, seem to work better
than other dynamic texture descriptors. To gain this under-
standing, it will be necessary to develop effective methods
for spatial and temporal registration, texture comparison and
spatio-temporal visualisation.
Another future research direction relates to training. The
ability of the BSIF representation (trained on completely
general dynamic texture videos) to perform well in antispoof-
ing applications is a very attractive attribute of the method.
However, in future studies, it would be interesting to assess
the merit of training BSIF filters using also spoofing attack
data.
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